Abstract. NTRU is a new public key cryptosystem proposed at Crypto 96 by Hoffstein, Pipher and Silverman from the Mathematics department of Brown University. It attracted considerable attention, and is being advertised over the Internet by NTRU Cryptosystems. Its security is based on the difficulty of analyzing the result of polynomial arithmetic modulo two unrelated moduli, and its correctness is based on clustering properties of the sums of random variables. In this paper, we apply new lattice basis reduction techniques to cryptanalyze the scheme, to discover either the original secret key, or an alternative secret key which is equally useful in decoding the ciphertexts.
Introduction
NTRU [l] was proposed at the rump session of Crypto 96, as a fast public-key encryption system. The authors explored several potential attacks against the scheme, but concluded that they are extremely unlikely t o succeed. In particular, they considered the standard lattice-based attack and showed that the attackers could not expect to find the secret key by computing the shortest vector in this lattice with the LLL [3] algorithm, since the secret key was surrounded by a "cloud" of exponentially many unrelated lattice vectors.
In this paper we present another lattice-based attack, which should either find the original secret key f or an alternative key f' which can be used in place of f to decrypt ciphertexts with only slightly higher computational complexity. We construct a lattice L , each of whose elements corresponds t o a potential decrypting key f'; the effectiveness off' for decrypting is directly related t o the length of the corresponding lattice element. If we find any vector f' as short as f , we can decrypt easily. If, instead, we find several vectors f'(i), each being 2 or 3 times the length o f f , then we can obtain partial decryptions from each potential key f'(i) and piece them together t o form a total decryption. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives some notation, and introduces a norm which will be useful to our analysis. In Section 3 we sketch the NTRU cryptographic system. In Section 4 we describe the lattice L. Section 5 relates the probability of success t o the lengths of the recovered short vectors in the lattice.
Notation
We denote the integers by Z and the integers modulo q by Z,. N is a positive integer. We will identify the vector space Z N (respectively 2,") with the ring of
A boldface letter f represents a vector. The convolution of two vectors is given by f * g where
this is the ordinary polynomial product in Z,[X]/(X" -l), and is both commutative and associative. The vector of all 1's is denoted by 1. The matrix of all 1's is J , and the identity matrix is I . The symbol p;' denotes a multiplicative inverse of p modulo q.
Approximations to a norm
For x E Z N define
So lxlI is the standard deviation of the entries of x, scaled by fl. This norm is invariant under the operation of adding t l to x, that is, adding t to each entry zi. It is the L2 norm of the projection of x orthogonal to the vector 1, hence the I symbol.
In some circumstances we will use the approximation
Indeed, letting x, = f + w, and yj = ji + zj we find with indices being considered modulo N . For each product w i 2 k -i w j z k -j counted in the sum, the difference j -i between the w-indices is the same as the difference (Ic -i) -(k -j ) between the z-indices. Letting d = i -j denote this common difference, and setting t = k -j , we rearrange the sum as: We sketch the NTRU system, as developed in [l] . We give sample parameters, based on the authors' original recommendations, to aid the reader's intuition, but with the caution that these parameters can be modified in future versions of the NTRU system. The private key contains vectors f E Sf and g E Sg related to the public key h, and integers s, t , t l , t 2 which need not be kept secret. The values f and g satisfy The private key also includes a vector fp', calculated from f, satisfying
This product corresponds to the polynomial 1.
E S+ and computes the ciphertext (mod p ) .
Encryption: To encrypt the plaintext m, the encryptor randomly selects
e = c $ * h + m (modq).
A different random choice of $I is made for each plaintext m. This removes dependence on the unknown 9, and recovers m.
tion possible. Using the approximation (1) we can say that
We estimate the bound on the elements of b which still make this computa-
where that all such 4 have the same norm.) Similarly is the norm of a typical element of S$. (We can arrange things SO It21 + f * ml , = Ifl , lmll.
Making the second assumption that the two vectors tll+pg*& and t z l + f * m are nearly orthogonal, we would obtain lbl; = It1 + p g * 9 + f * ml:2= It11 + p g * 41; + It21 + f * rnl; = P2 Igli 1 9 1 : + lfl? lmll. 1 which we choose to write as Make the third assumption that the entries of b are nonnally distributed, with mean near 0 (this governed our choice of t ) and standard deviation c x lbll I n . The decoding procedure will fail if any of the N entries bi exceeds q / 2 in absolute value.
In the table below, we see the effect of letting 4/2 he a reasonable multiple (3,4,5 or 6) of the standard deviation c. The second column gives the probability that an individual term lbil will exceed q / 2 (and hence he misinterpreted), and the third column gives the probability that at least one of the N = 167 terms ( b i ( exceeds q / 2 {and hence the decryption is incorrect). So if 4/2 = 5 0 [that is, u = 4/10) the procedure will correctly decode most messages. We would want to arrange parameters so that u < 4/10, and a smaller value of u would ensure higher reliability.
Individual

Remark:
We are essentially using an estimate on the L2 norm of b to produce an estimate of its LO3 norm; the L2 bound is relatively easy to estimate, but the L" bound is what is required for error-free decoding.
The lattice
We have seen that reliability of decoding is directly related to the ratio of u M lbl, / f i to 4. In turn, equation (3) gives an estimate of (bll in terms of If(, and lglil where p g = f * h (mod 4).
Let us consider an alternate N-vector f' which the cryptanalyst can use in place of the correct value f . Calculate from equation (2) a value g', and from equation (3) an estimate of Ib'll. If this value Ib'lL is comparable to (bl, (smaller or not much larger), then the cryptanalyst will be able to mimic the legitimate decoder, using f' and g', to decode the message.
Thus we find the system of equations
Consider and Im(, to be held constant at their "typical" values. Setting The presence of H in the lower left of L' insures the relation g' = p;lh * f'
(mod q), and the block qI serves to perform the reduction modulo q. The vectors Xf' and g' will generally have nonzero mean, but we are interested in the orthogonal norms If'/* and lg'll. To this end, subtract from each column vector v in the top half of L' the constant vector ( V ) 1 so that the result has zero mean; similarly each vector w in the bottom half of L' is replaced by w -(w)l.
Our new matrix L is then
H -a J q I -( q / N ) J
where J is the matrix of all l's, and Q: is a suitably chosen scalar.
Remark: L has only 2N -2 independent vectors, because
Now a typical vector is and the square of its L2 norm is Thus the norm of the lattice element ~f ' ,~ is directly related to the suitability off' as a decrypting key.
Remark: We also need f' to be invertible modulo p , so that fi-' can be used in the decrypting process. This seems to be a weak requirement.
For a given vector f', select x to minimize this norm, and define then we may have to work with faulty partial information: a few of the estimate integers bi might be incorrect, leading to a few incorrect linear equations among a collection of mostly correct ones. Then we will have to resort to techniques from error-correcting codes to discover the incorrect equations among the correct ones. So our success depends on the success of lattice basis reduction methods in finding relatively short vectors in the lattice. If we find a vector as short as f:
nf' I nf then clearly we can use f' as a decrypting key. If we find two vectors not much longer than f: nr(l) = n p ) 5 2.5 x nf then each will give us partial information, and we can combine this information via linear algebra to recover m. If we find several vectors somewhat longer yet, npi) M 4 x nf then we still have a chance, if error-correcting techniques can be applied. which is clearly insufficient. Schnorr [4], [5] has improved the original methods by using block techniques; he can find shorter vectors, at a higher computational price, than LLL. But it is still not guaranteed to find vectors as short as To summarize: if there are many vectors f' with nfl 5 nf then we are likely to stumble across one and be able to decrypt. If f is much shorter than all other vectors, then we are likely to find f. The only hope for the scheme to remain secure is for many vectors to satisfy, say, n r = 10 x nf and hope that the lattice basis reduction methods fail to find f among the sea of f'. With any improvements in the technology of lattice basis reduction, this temporary security would vanish.
Other comments
The lattice used in our main attack contains linear combinations of the columns of the circulant matrix H and appropriate multiples of the identity matrix I . An alternative lattice attack is to consider the dual lattice which characterizes all the integral solutions of the following homogeneous equation H * f = pg t qk, where f , g and k are three vectors with integral unknowns, and p , q are the two moduli. This lattice is closely related to that described in Section 4, except for the difference between x and IxIL; it is hoped that this alternative description might help the reader's intuition. of 2n integers which make the n entries in k integral. It is easy to show that it forms a lattice since its discrete and closed under addition. This lattice has full dimension 2n (except in degenerate cases), and we can find the 2n basis vectors in two groups of n. In each group we combine the n column vectors into a matrix, and denote the resultant n x n matrices F G and K :
1. Find a basis for the homogeneous case in which K = 0. The small column vector we are looking for in this lattice has entries of zero and one in the top half, and around two or three in the bottom half. We believe that for the recommended parameters of the NTRU cryptosystem, the LLL algorithm will be able to find the original secret key f as the first half of such an unusually short lattice vector.
Extensions
We understand that the authors of NTRU, after learning the details of our attack, are continuing their research into related schemes [2] .
One direction of their research involves schemes similar to NTRU but with larger parameters. The expense, for the designers of the system, comes with larger public keys and more time-consuming encryption. The added security comes from the notion that in a lattice of higher dimension (several hundred) it will be computationally harder for the opponent to find high-quality vectors. To maintain this security, one must keep ahead of advances in lattice basis reduction techniques.
Another direction of their research involves extensions to noncommutative groups. Instead of using a group algebra over ZN (that is, the ring Z , [ X ] / ( X Nl)), one would use a group algebra over a noncommutative group. At the time of this writing we have not had sufficient time t o analyze these proposed extensions, but we hope to be able to comment on the noncommutative version in the final version of the paper.
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